"El Status" and Puerto Ricans in the Mainland: Acculturation and Group Identity

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ABSTRACT

Puerto Ricans have been migrating to the mainland United States since Puerto Rico became a US territory, a phenomenon that has intensified after Puerto Rico entered an unrelenting recession in 2006. As a result, there are now more Puerto Ricans in the "States" than on the island (Duany 2011, 2017). Consequently, the political views stateside Puerto Ricans hold could influence congressional, presidential, or even state elections. In this paper we show how acculturation and group identity influence the political preferences of Puerto Ricans stateside. Using data from the 1989-90 Latino National Political Survey and the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study Latino Module, we find that high English proficiency, being born in the US and identifying primarily as "American" are all predictive of a preference for statehood. We also examine the effect measures of acculturation and group identity, including primary identity as "Puerto Rican," have on preference for independence and a territorial status. [Keywords: Political status, Political preference, Acculturation, Group identity, Migration]

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Introduction

Puerto Rico has been a US unincorporated territory since 1898. Although many important events have occurred since then, the lives of Puerto Ricans have been particularly influenced by two phenomena: a significant migration to the United States mainland and the never-ending debate of what the island's final relationship with Washington, D.C., should be—the so-called "status debate." While the presence of Puerto Ricans in the United States predates its colonial rule over the island, almost as soon as the island became its territory, Puerto Ricans began to migrate there. There have been several migration waves throughout the twentieth century, and the migration of Puerto Ricans from the island to the United States mainland has become particularly acute after the former's economy entered an unrelenting recession in 2006. As a result, there are now more Puerto Ricans in the United States than on the island (Duany 2011, 2017).

The status debate regarding the relations Puerto Rico has with the United States is the main issue that to this day divides Puerto Rican politics (Anderson 1988; Cámara Fuertes 2010; Meléndez 1998). Traditionally, there have been three options to solve the status debate around which Puerto Ricans have organized politically: independence, becoming a US state, or some form of autonomy—including the current Commonwealth status (Estado Libre Asociado—ELA, in Spanish) established in 1952. Many of the political controversies on the island revolve around this core political issue and the three historical political parties identify themselves with each of these status options (Anderson 1988; Cámara Fuertes 2010)

It is only natural that when Puerto Ricans migrate to the United States, they bring with them their status preferences, be it support for independence, statehood, the Commonwealth, or another territorial status. Although status preference is believed to be a stable long-term preference (Barreto and Eagles 2000), factors like adaptation to new social environments can influence political preference. In this paper we bring acculturation theory (Gordon 1964; Berry 1997, 1992) to bear on the study of the political status preferences of Puerto Ricans who live stateside. In doing so, we focus on how acculturation may be associated with these political preferences. We define acculturation as the social incorporation of migrants and immigrants to their new place of living, which involves behavioral and cultural adaptation that results in new values, attitudes, and identities (Gordon 1964; Berry 1997, 1992). We measure acculturation through language proficiency, language use (Cabassa 2003; Marín et al. 1987; Negy and Woods 1992), and place of birth and time residing in the United States (Cabassa 2003; Negy and Woods 1992). Group identification is central to acculturation theory because changes in cultural identity are universally recognized as part of the process of adaptation to a new culture (Gordon 1964; Berry 1997; Cabassa 2003). We define group identity as a person's awareness of belonging and attachment to a social or cultural group. We operationalize it using the respondent's preferred group identity label, namely "American" and "Puerto Rican."

We find that both acculturation and group identity are related to status preference, although language and nativity seem to have a more consistent association in the expected direction than group identity. In general, less acculturated Puerto Ricans tend to favor the Commonwealth or a territorial status over statehood, while those who are more acculturated tend to favor statehood. In a similar vein, those that identify as Puerto Ricans tend to prefer

the Commonwealth or a territorial status, while those that identify as American tend to prefer statehood. On the other hand, results for independence are not consistent and tend to be counterintuitive. In addition, the use of two surveys almost twenty years apart yield similar results, but at the same time reflect the increasing acceptance of statehood and rejection of the Commonwealth that is typically seen among Puerto Ricans on the island in the twenty-first century. These conclusions are a contribution not only in understanding the political views of Puerto Ricans who live in the United States—a growing group of influence—but also about the impact of acculturation and group identity in public opinion.

The literature in the field of Latino politics has identified many instances where political attitudes and behaviors are influenced by acculturation. For example, there is significant evidence that trust in government is related to acculturation. As acculturation increases in Latinos, trust in government decreases (Michelson 2003b; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010), and this increase in distrust is different depending on whether Latinos are acculturating into an ethnic minority subculture or into the mainstream American culture (Michelson 2007). The relationship between acculturation and trust appears to be focused on trust in the national government but not in local government (Wenzel 2006). Furthermore, Michelson (2003a) finds this pattern of acculturation and trust among stateside Puerto Ricans. The impact of acculturation is also present in the preferences of Latinos on immigration (Pedraza 2014; Rouse, Wilkinson and Garand 2010) and in other policy areas (Branton 2007).

In contrast, empirical research into the sources of status preferences by Puerto Ricans residing on the island or stateside is lacking (Falcón 2007; Cámara Fuertes and Rosas Cintrón 2004). For example, Falcón comments:

> The diaspora has always been a bit of a mystery in terms of its attitudes toward its homeland. Because they were now participants in the world's most advanced economy, were they now supporters of statehood for Puerto Rico? Because they came during the long-term regime of the pro-Commonwealth political party, did they support the status quo? Or did their racialization in the United States make them support independence? And in the end, does this matter to the future of Puerto Rico? (2007, 28)

From a practical perspective, how status preferences may change in response to acculturation through language, nativity and group identity, all key indicators of acculturation, can have important political implications because there are now so many Puerto Ricans living in the mainland United States—and many of them are concentrated in specific locations like central Florida, New York City, and Chicago (Duany 2017). The political views that Puerto Rican migrants hold on the political status of the island could influence congressional, presidential, and state level elections. For example, in early 2020 candidates like Michael Bloomberg, Andrew Yang, and John Delaney stated their support for statehood for Puerto Rico in hopes of gaining support from Puerto Rican voters in the 2020 Democratic Primary contest (Daugherty 2020). Most notably, former president Barack Obama stated his support of Puerto Rican statehood during a speech at John Lewis's funeral in August 2020 (New York Times 2020), and presidential candidate Joe Biden stated his support for statehood during a campaign event held in Florida in mid-September 2020 (AP Archive 2020).

The increasing numbers of stateside Puerto Ricans appears to be making the status issue more salient in Congress. In the 1980s and 1990s, members of Congress submitted 15 bills related to the political status of Puerto Rico. These fifteen bills had a total of 228 cosponsors. Between 2000 and May 2019 the number of these bills remained steady with 14 submitted, but the number of cosponsors increased almost fourfold to 845.[1] However, Puerto Ricans in Congress are not united on "el status." For example, Luis Gutierrez, former congressman from Chicago, has long been a supporter of Puerto Rican independence (Brown 2021). Congresswomen Nydia Velázquez and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (Acevedo 2020), both from New York, support a self-determination process for the Puerto Rican people, but have not stated official support for a particular political status. Finally, Jenniffer González-Colón, the Puerto Rico Resident Commissioner (the official island delegate to the US House of Representatives) proposed legislation to admit Puerto Rico as a state along with congressmen Darren Soto of Florida and Ritchie Torres of New York as cosponsors of the bill. Thus, understanding the if and how acculturation and group identity influence the status preference of Puerto Rican migrants is important in understanding the future of politics in the United States.

This paper is divided into five sections. First, we will provide a brief background to the status and migration issues. Second, we will focus on acculturation theory, including the well-established link of language, nativity, and group identity to political preferences. Third, we discuss our data and methodology for analysis. Fourth, we present our results and discuss them. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss their implications.

The Puerto Rico Status Debate and Migration

Since the annexation of Puerto Rico by the United States, the island's politics have been defined by its relationship with the United States, the so-called "status issue." The political debate has revolved around three possible alternatives: becoming an independent nation, becoming a US state (statehood), or some form of autonomous government. The status debate is, in many ways, central to Puerto Rican politics. In 1952, under the leadership of then Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, Puerto Ricans inaugurated a new constitution that established the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The new political status set up an autonomous local government in association with the United States. The US Congress established the foundations for the new status with the approval of Public Law 600 and ratified it with some changes to the island's constitution.[2] However, this new relationship did not slow down the debate among Puerto Ricans of what their relationship with the US should be, and the status remained the main cleavage that divides Puerto Rican politics (Anderson 1988; Cámara Fuertes 2010).

Since the establishment of the Commonwealth, there have been seven plebiscites or referendums related to the status issue in Puerto Rico: the 1967 status plebiscite, the 1991 referendum on democratic rights, the status plebiscite of 1993, the status plebiscite of 1998, the 2012 plebiscite on the territorial status, the 2017 plebiscite for "immediate decolonization" and the 2020 plebiscite for the final definition of the status of Puerto Rico. The beginning of the twenty-first century signaled a decreasing support for the status quo and a greater preference for statehood. In 2012, for the first time, a majority of Puerto Ricans rejected the territorial status.[3] In that vote, 54 percent of the voters answered "No" to the question "Do you agree that

TABLE 1
Status Plebiscites/Referendums

Description	Alternatives	%
	1967 Status Plebiscite	
This plebiscite had the three-traditional-status formula. It was boycotted by the Statehood Republican Party (PER)	**Commonwealth**	**60.4***
	Statehood	39
	Independence	0.6
	Voter Turnout	62
	1991 Constitutional Referendum on Democratic Rights	
Referendum to amend the Constitution to specify how status plebiscites should be held.	**No**	**53**
	Yes	44.9
	Voter Turnout	60.7
	1993 Status Plebiscite	
This plebiscite had the three-traditional-status formula.	**Commonwealth**	**48.9**
	Statehood	46.6
	Independence	4.5
	Voter Turnout	73.5
	1998 Status Plebiscite	
This plebiscite originally had only "non-territorial" options, which eliminated "Commonwealth" from the alternatives. A decision by the courts forced the inclusion of a "none of the above" alternative which supporters of the Commonwealth used as its proxy.	"Territorial option"	> 0.1
	Independence	0.3
	Statehood	46.6
	"Free Asociation"	2.6
	None of the above	**50.5**
	Total votes/Voter Turnout	71.3

Puerto Rico should continue to have its present form of territorial status?" (see Table 1). The "Current territory" alternative in the 2017 plebiscite received just a few votes, but that vote was boycotted by two of the three main political parties and had scant electoral participation. In the 2020 plebiscite that was held concurrently with the General Elections, 53 percent voted in favor of statehood. In this plebiscite, the only alternative presented was statehood, and voters were asked to choose between support or rejection of this alternative.

Puerto Ricans have migrated to the United States for many decades. While the presence of Puerto Rican exiles in the United States predates its colonial rule over the island, almost as soon as the island became its territory in 1898, Puerto Ricans began to migrate there. Puerto Ricans have continued to move to the mainland since then almost uninterruptedly. The period between 1945 and 1964, referred to as "the Great Migration," had a net migration

TABLE 1 (continued)
Status Plebiscites/Referendums

Description	Alternatives	%
2012 Consultation on the Territorial Status		
This plebiscite had two separate parts. First, voters selected if they were satisfied with the current territorial status (Commonwealth). Second, they were asked to choose from a list of "non-territorial" alternatives. PPD leadership argued that the ballot was not balanced and asked its followers to leave the second option blank since Commonwealth was not in the list (hence the large percentage of blank ballots).	Question 1: "Are you satisfied with the current territorial status?"	
	Yes	46
	No	**54**
	Question 2: Non-Territorial Options	
	Sovereign Free Associated State	24.4
	Statehood	**44.8**
	Independence	4
	Blank	26.8
	Total votes/Voter turnout	78.2
2017 Plebiscite for the Immediate Decolonization of Puerto Rico		
The PPD and the PIP boycotted this plebiscite, which was meant to be on the lines of "Statehood yes or no". As a result participation was very low.	**Statehood**	**97.1**
	Free Assoc./Independence	1.5
	Current Territorial Status	1.4
	Voter Turnout	23.2

Winning alternatives highlighted in bold.
* Percentages are based on the votes of the options in the ballot and exclude blank and spoiled ballots.
Source: Puerto Rico State Electoral Commission (ceepur.org), Bayrón Toro (2000), El País (2017)

to the mainland of some 650,000 Puerto Ricans (Duany 2017). While there was a period, in the 1970s, when more people returned from the mainland to the island, outward migration accelerated again during the 1980s.

After the island's long recession began in 2006, outward migration picked up even more.[4] An average of 53,020 people left Puerto Rico each year between 2010 and 2014, compared to 47,400 between 1950 and 1954 during the period of the Great Migration (Duany 2017). The total population of the island decreased from 3.9 million in 2006 at the start of the recession to 3.3 million in July 2017, just before Hurricanes Irma and María devastated the island. The net migration during this period was equivalent to the loss of 15.7 percent of the 2006 population (Mora, Dávila and Rodríguez 2017). As a result of Hurricanes Irma and María, an additional 130,000 people left the island, almost 4 percent of the population (Sutter 2018). Many of these resettled to Florida. Since 2003, more Puerto Ricans live in the fifty US states than on the island (Falcón 2004). Duany (2017) reported that in 2009 the proportion of Puerto Ricans living stateside was 53.4 percent, relative to those living on the island.

Although migration and the status debate are separate issues, they are, in a way, intertwined. Migration has been an escape valve for many looking for work or better living conditions stateside that the Commonwealth has failed to provide (Duany 2017; Mora, Dávila and Rodríguez 2017).

Acculturation, Group Identity, and Political Preference

We argue that acculturation can help to explain the status preferences of stateside Puerto Ricans. Acculturation theory explains how groups and individuals adapt through behavioral, psychological, and identity changes. Acculturation can be understood as cultural changes among migrants and immigrants, resulting from continuous contact with the culture of their host society. This is a process of adaptation that involves individual level changes that result in new values, attitudes, behavioral shifts, and changes in group identities (Berry 1997, 1992; Gordon 1964). Even though Puerto Rico is part of the United States, Puerto Rican culture is different from the cultural environment in many states of the Union. Puerto Rican migrants encounter upon arrival a different language, foods, customs, political ideologies, and lifestyles (Duany 2011). Puerto Rican migrants must cope with these changes behaviorally and psychologically through the process of acculturation, a process that has been found to result in changes to political attitudes and preferences. The literature on acculturation and politics among Latinos in the United States has found that acculturation can change levels of political trust among Latinos of all backgrounds (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Michelson 2001, 2003b and 2007; Wenzel 2006) including Puerto Ricans (Michelson 2003a). Furthermore, acculturation has also been found to have significant effects on political attitudes regarding public policy (Branton 2007; Branton, Wrinkle and Franco 2010; Branton et al. 2014) and immigration policy (Hood et al. 1997; Pedraza 2014; Rouse et al. 2010).

Directly related to our research, there is empirical evidence to suggest that living in a US state does indeed change the political preferences of Puerto Ricans, including their status preferences. Vargas-Ramos (2011) finds that Puerto Rican migrants become "resocialized" while living in the United States, especially in relation to political participation. Those who had migrated to the United States had lower levels of various forms of political engagement while they lived stateside. In addition, while returning migrants (those who migrated to the United States and later returned to live in Puerto Rico) held similar status preferences to those who never left the island, those who lived in a state the longest were more likely to favor statehood. However, once they returned to the island and time passed, they held views and participated in politics at similar levels than those that had never left. Additionally, research has found that Puerto Ricans who had lived outside the island at some point preferred either statehood or independence over the Commonwealth (Cámara Fuertes and Rosas Cintrón 2004).

Studies of acculturation typically include measures of two particular aspects of acculturation, namely English proficiency and use (Fraga et al. 2010; Cabassa 2003; Negy and Woods 1992) and nativity (Cabassa 2003; Negy and Woods 1992). While some studies of Latino acculturation also look at other behavioral measures like social interaction with Anglos, English proficiency and nativity are the most frequently used measures of acculturation in Latino politics research. Michelson argues that "[b]y far the most widely used and most reliable mea-

sures of acculturation are those that measure language use and proficiency" (2003b, 293). Marín and Gamba (1996) tested the reliability of language as a measure of acculturation and found that their language-based acculturation scale proved to be more powerful than social-behavioral based scales in measuring acculturation. More importantly, many have successfully used language as a measure of acculturation both in relation to Latinos and Asian Americans (Fraga et al. 2010; Giles et al. 1979; Marin et al. 1987; Michelson 2003b; Pérez and Padilla 2000; Lee, Nguyen and Tsui 2011; Tolbert Kimbro, Gorman and Schachter 2012).

It is important to note that when Puerto Ricans arrive stateside, a significant number of them do not speak or understand English. According to the US Census, in 2019 only 25 percent of residents in the island spoke only English or spoke English "very well." Seventy-four percent spoke English "less than very well," and 93 percent spoke primarily Spanish in their homes (US Census, 2019). Thus, learning to use English is an important cultural adaptation to succeed in their new home.

The length of residence stateside, and migrating or being born in the United States are also important and often used as measures of acculturation. These are direct measures of the amount of contact migrants have had with the dominant culture in their host society (Berry 1997, 1992). Those born in the United States are more likely to be acculturated than those that were not because they have been socialized into its customs and way of life since birth. Similarly, in the case of those born outside the United States, the more time they have spent stateside, the more time they have had to be acculturated into the norms, culture, and practices of the United States. In other words, acculturation is a function of the time exposed to a country's culture (Olmedo 1979; Negy and Woods 1992; Cabassa 2003). However, being born stateside is no guarantee of full acculturation. Puerto Ricans born stateside often live in a mix of birth cohorts. This situation can prevent total cultural and identity assimilation (Silver and Vélez 2017).

Another factor that may influence status preference for those migrating from Puerto Rico to the mainland is group identity. Group identity is central to acculturation theory because acculturation can lead individuals to shift away from their original group identity in order to adopt a new identity aligned with that of the dominant society they are embedded in. Group identification refers to an individual's awareness of belonging and having a psychological attachment to a specific group based on shared beliefs, feelings, interests, and ideas with other members of the group (McClain et al. 2009). Political science research has long explored the connection between group identity and politics (Egan 2020). Initial research in this area explored how Irish or Italian candidates influenced electoral participation, and found that ethnic candidates led to higher turnout among co-ethnic voters and that co-ethnics were more likely to vote for them (Wolfinger 1965; Dahl 1961). Later on, race and politics scholars would explore how shared race between Black candidates/elected officials enhanced political engagement and representation for Black voters (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Tate 2003; Dawson 1995).

We simply define Puerto Rican identity as self-identification as "Puerto Rican." Puerto Ricans face a dual pull of group identity even before leaving the island since it is a territory of the US and they are US citizens, but have a separate history, language, and culture. De jure, they are both Puerto Rican and American, but they may self-identify with one of these group identities more strongly than the other. Group identity labels have been found to be

indicative of immigrant/migrant cultural adaptation among Latinos (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Jones-Correa 2007; Fraga et al. 2010). Furthermore, Latino politics scholars have found that group identity labels and acculturation among Latinos are related to varied levels of political engagement (Stokes-Brown 2009; Tucker and Santiago 2013; Jamal et al. 2019), and differences in vote choice (Stokes-Brown 2006; DeSipio and Uhlaner 2007), and partisanship (Dutwin et al. 2005).

Group identity is also a strong indicator of acculturation (Gordon 1964; Berry 1997, 1992; Cabassa 2003). Berry (1992) explains that, in the process of acculturation, group identities "often shift away from those held prior to contact" with a migrant's host society, and that "relinquishing one's cultural identity" is part of assimilation into the dominant group surrounding migrants and immigrants. Fraga and colleagues (2010) found that more years spent living in the United States after immigration/migration is associated with higher rates of identification as American among Latinos in general, and that those who have spent the least time in the United State are more likely to identify with their country of origin. Pew Research Center found that Puerto Ricans tend to identify as American at a higher rate than any other Latino subgroup, with 28 percent describing themselves as American (Hugo-López 2013). On the other hand, Puerto Ricans retain a strong sense of being Puerto Rican and maintain a sense of belonging to a Puerto Rican nation (Duany 2011). This aligns with the view of Fraga and associates (2010), who argue that Latinos hold multiple identities but that the acculturation process can influence.

In Puerto Rico, pride in the contribution of Puerto Ricans to its economy and pride in the island's Olympic representation were negatively related to support for statehood in relation to the Commonwealth status (Cámara Fuertes and Rosas Cintrón 2004). Consequently, political scientists have used a combination of direct measurements of acculturation, including language, nativity, and group identity among Latinos in order to understand their political behaviors and preferences within the American context.

We argue that both acculturation and group identity impact the status preference of Puerto Ricans that live in the US mainland. Thus, we propose two main hypotheses:

> **H1**: Acculturation is related to status preference. Higher levels of acculturation operationalized as the English proficiency, use of English, being born stateside, and length of residence stateside, will be associated with an increase of the support for statehood and less support for the Commonwealth/Territory and independence alternatives.
> **H2**: Group identity is related to status preference. Specifically, identifying as "American" will be associated with an increase of the support for statehood and less support for the Commonwealth/Territory and independence alternatives. On the other hand, identifying as "Puerto Rican" will be associated with a decrease in the support for statehood and a stronger support for the Commonwealth/Territory and independence alternatives.

The reasoning behind these two hypotheses is simple: preferring statehood means integrating the island to the mainland; thus, those already acculturated to life there should be

more at ease with a complete integration of the island to the social, cultural, and political life in the United States. In a similar vein, those who feel American would have their group identity aligned with those who live in the US, while those who primarily identify themselves as Puerto Ricans would still have, to some degree, a separate group identity to Americans, which is more aligned to favoring Commonwealth or independence.

Data and Methods

In this work we use cross-sectional data from the Latino National Political Survey of 1989-1990 (LNPS) and the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study Latino Module (CCES Latino Module) to examine how acculturation is related to determining political status preference among mainland Puerto Ricans (De la Garza et al. 1998; Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017). To our knowledge these are the only two publicly available sources of data that include the two features necessary for us to conduct this research: (1) a sufficient amount of self-identified Puerto Ricans residing in the United States; and (2) a question about their preference regarding the political status of Puerto Rico. The LNPS was constructed to measure the political attitudes and behaviors of the three major Latino groups in the United States: Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans, and Puerto Ricans. This survey was fielded between July 1989 and March 1990 with a total of 2,817 Latino respondents, and 598 non-Latino white respondents. Of those in the Latino sample, a total of 589 self-identified as Puerto Rican. The 2016 CCES Latino Module was administered to 2,023 voting age Latino respondents from all fifty states. The survey was conducted alongside the Common Content of the CCES[5] and was fielded in English and Spanish, with the respondents selecting which language they preferred at the beginning of the survey. The CCES Latino Module did not focus on any one ethnic group or set of groups Latinos; thus, the subset of self-identified Puerto Ricans is quite smaller than that of the LNPS. A total 192 respondents in the CCES Latino Module self-identified as Puerto Rican.

Our dependent variable in both the LNPS and the CCES Latino Module is virtually the same: the respondents preferred political status for Puerto Rico. The wording of the political status question in each study is somewhat different, but the options presented to the respondents represent the three traditional political status options that have dominated Puerto Rican politics. In the LNPS the options are (1) "Become a state," (2) "Become independent," and (3) "Remain as a Commonwealth."[6] In the CCES Latino Module questionnaire the options are (1) "Become a state of the United States," (2) Become an independent country," and (3) "Remain a territory of the United States." Though the first two options in each questionnaire are very similar, there is a particular difference between the third response option given in the LNPS and the one given in the CCES Latino Module. The latter uses the word "territory" instead of "Commonwealth" to take into account the multiplicity of territorial alternatives that are being explored by political groups in Puerto Rico.

"Territory" and "Commonwealth" have similar, but not identical, meanings. As suggested above, "territory" is a wider, more encompassing term than "Commonwealth." Commonwealth is a type of territory. It must be noted that in the political discourse of Puerto Rican politics, some supporters of the Commonwealth reject the use of "territory" because it can implicitly reject the validity of the ELA as established in 1952. However, the term has become

TABLE 2
Preferred Political Status for Puerto Rico

Status	Total	%
2016 CCES Latino Survey		
Become a state of the United States	68	46%
Become an independent country	25	17%
Remain a territory of the United States	55	37%
Total	148	100%
LNPS 1989-90		
Become a state	153	27%
Become independent	20	4%
Remain as a commonwealth	389	69%
Total	561	100%

Weighted totals and percentages exclude respodents who did not provide an answer or answered "don't know" to the question.

more common in the political discourse of the past decade, with some members of the PPD using the term to describe the current political system.[7] While we would have preferred equal terms in both datasets, as is often the case, we have to work with the data that already exist. It is reassuring that the changes from the LNPS to the CCES reflect the trends and changes that have occurred in the status plebiscites held in Puerto Rico. Still, it is important to note that for some respondents, the term "territory" is less acceptable than "Commonwealth."

Since the LNPS was conducted in 1989-90, there have been changes regarding which of the three traditional status options dominate Puerto Rican politics. In the LNPS, a majority of mainland Puerto Ricans preferred remaining as a Commonwealth, with 69 percent selecting this political status for Puerto Rico. In the 2016 CCES Latino Module dataset, however, only 37 percent of Puerto Ricans preferred the territorial option. While only 27 percent of those interviewed in 1989 supported statehood as their preferred option, a plurality (43 percent) of those interviewed in 2016 selected "becoming a state of the United States" as their preference. Preference for Puerto Rico becoming independent from the United States maintained its minority position among the options presented to respondents in both studies, approximately 4 percent in the LNPS and 10 percent in the CCES Latino Module.[8] While it is possible that some of this change is due to question wording—"Commonwealth" would appear to be a more palatable word to describe Puerto Rico than "territory"—most likely these changes reflect the changing preferences of Puerto Ricans on the island as reflected in the different status plebiscites discussed above.

Our analysis includes two sets of independent variables and a set of control variables.[9]

We measure acculturation using two variables that indicate time spent in the United States (where they were born and time spent stateside) and three variables that measure English language proficiency and use. As discussed in detail in the theoretical section, these measures are strongly related to acculturation among different groups of Latinos, including Puerto Ricans. In Puerto Rico, time spent living in the United States has been linked to status preference and political behavior (Cámara Fuertes 2005; Vargas Ramos 2011). In addition, Puerto Ricans who said that they liked to talk in English were associated with a stronger support for statehood vis-a-vis the Commonwealth (Cámara Fuertes and Rosas Cintrón 2004).

We include a dummy variable that indicates whether the respondents were born in Puerto Rico (0) or in one of the fifty states of the Union (1). Thirty-two percent of Puerto Ricans in the 2016 study and 35 percent of those interviewed in 1989-90 were born in the United States. In addition, respondents in both datasets were asked how many years they had been living in the United States. The CCES Latino Module specifically asks respondents to estimate how many years they have been in the United States, while the LNPS asks each respondent their age at immigration (or migration in the case of Puerto Ricans)—information that we convert into years by subtracting their age at the time of interview. In order not to lose any observations in our analysis, we include the age of those born in the US as the number of years spent in the United States.

We operationalized the three language proficiency and use variables in our model as (1) language of interview, (2) language use at home, and (3) language of news media. Language of interview in the CCES is a dummy variable in the 2016 study, where Spanish equals zero (0) and English equals one (1) because respondents had to self-select into either language for the online questionnaire administration. However, since the LNPS was administered face-to-face, it was up to the bilingual interviewers to document which language was mostly used by each respondent. This resulted in a three-value variable, which we have recoded as follows: "mostly Spanish" = -1; "both Spanish and English" = 0; and "mostly English" = 1. In 2016 a majority of Puerto Rican respondents (67 percent) chose to complete the online questionnaire in English, while 47 percent of respondents in 1989-90 completed their interviews "mostly in English." In both datasets, English was not the dominant language used at home (16 percent in 2016 and 26 percent in 1989-90).[10] Finally, we include an index of two variables that asked the respondents in each study to report the language in which they consumed television news and print news. We recoded this index item into three values ("mostly Spanish" = -1; "both Spanish and English" = 0; and "mostly English" = 1). Puerto Ricans in both the CCES Latino Study and the LNPS consumed most of their news in English, 62 percent and 47 percent, respectively.

We measure Puerto Rican respondents' group identity as the preference of the "American" or "Puerto Rican" identity labels. In the 2016 CCES Latino Module, respondents were asked which was their preferred identity label to the exclusion of others by giving them a single answer question with four alternatives. For Puerto Ricans in this study, the alternatives were (1) Puerto Rican, (2) Latino, (3) Hispanic and (4) American. We used the results from this question to create two dummy variables, one indicating those who prefer "Puerto Rican" (Puerto Rican = 1; all else = 0) as their preferred identity label (67.5 percent), and the other indicating those who chose "American" (American = 1; all else = 0) as their preferred label (10.9 percent).

LNPS 1989-90 respondents were asked in two instances to select their preferred identity labels. The first identity question gave respondents a list of "names" used by persons of Hispanic heritage,[11] and then they were asked to circle any "names" with which they identified.[12] Interviewers were tasked with indicating if respondents circled only one or multiple of these names or identity labels. Forty percent of Puerto Ricans interviewed selected only one identity label from a list of fifteen names. The fact that they circled only one identity label on the list makes it clear that this is the preferred identity for these respondents. The second identity question was a follow up for those respondents who chose more than one name from the list they were given. They were asked which identity label they preferred from all of the ones they had circled in the previous question.[13]

We coded the results from both questions into two new variables of preferred identity. The first is a dummy variable that indicates which Puerto Ricans only circled "American" in the first identity question, along with those who said that "American" was their preferred identity label in the follow up identity question (American = 1; all else = 0). The second is a dummy variable that indicates which respondents only circled "Puerto Rican" in the first identity question, along with those who said that "Puerto Rican" was their preferred identity label in the follow-up identity question (Puerto Rican = 1, all else = 0). Overall, 9 percent of Puerto Ricans in the LNPS chose "American" and 73 percent chose "Puerto Rican" as their preferred identity. Thus, in both instances, Latino/Hispanic is the reference category in order to avoid creating missing values that would reduce the number of observations in each regression model.

We used four control variables in our models: age, education, gender, and household income. Cámara Fuertes and Rosas Cintrón (2004) have linked each to status preference in Puerto Rico: higher levels of education and young age were associated with support for independence, receiving food stamps with support for statehood, and also gender (women), to support for Commonwealth. They argue that this is because supporters of statehood put a premium on security (particularly economic security), while supporters of independence prize national pride above security. Old age and the need for food stamps are associated with a stronger need for security. Young people are less likely to have children or important financial obligations, while middle aged or older people are more likely to have dependent children and significant financial responsibilities (mortgages, etc.). Older people also tend to depend on fixed income and have higher levels of financial insecurity. The need for food stamps is a clear indicator of financial instability. Those with higher levels of education tend to have more employment options. Also, education, high income, and young age have been linked to post-materialist values, which put self-expression and other values over security (Inglehart 1990).[14]

Thus, our model is:
Status preference = β Place of birth + β Years living in the US + β Lang. of interview + β Lang. at home + β Lang. of news media + β Identifying as "Puerto Rican" + β Identifying as "American" + β Age + β Education + β Gender + β Income

In our analysis, we use multinomial logistic regression as is appropriate for nominal dependent variables with more than two outcomes (Hilbe 2009). We ran one multinomial logistic regression for each survey and then calculated predicted probabilities for the effect of

each explanatory variable on all three outcomes for preferred political status among stateside Puerto Ricans. Rather than focus on coefficients, we focus on the discussion of predicted probabilities because they represent the substantive effects of acculturation and group identity on preferred political status. Furthermore, the use of predicted probabilities as the focus of our analysis allows for simultaneous discussion of the effect of the explanatory variables on all three outcomes of political status preference, namely statehood, independence, and Commonwealth/territory.[15]

Results

In this section we present predicted probabilities calculated from of two multinomial logistic models of political preference among Puerto Ricans living in the United States, a model for the 2016 CCES Latino Module, and a model for the LNPS 1989-90 (regression tables are available in the appendix). We present the results as figures illustrating the predicted probabilities for the effects of acculturation, and group identity on preference for statehood, independence, or territory/Commonwealth status alternatives (for detailed predicted probability table see the appendix). Predicted probabilities allow us to focus on the substantive effects of the independent variables on our variable of interest by discussing the size and direction of the change in the probability of supporting each political status simultaneously when moving from the lowest to the highest value in each independent variable. For clarity, we first present the results for the 1989-90 LNPS equation and then the 2016 CCES results.

1989-90 LNPS

Recall that our first hypothesis was that higher levels of acculturation would result in a stronger support for statehood in relation to supporting Commonwealth or independence. With regard to nativity, the effects of being born in the United States are illustrated in Figure 1(a). As expected, having been born in the United States increased the likelihood of preferring statehood by 9.8 percent over being born in Puerto. Being born stateside also had a positive effect on preference for independence among Puerto Ricans living in the United States with an increase in support of 5.3 percent. Being born in the US increased support for statehood and independence, whereas we find that it decreased the likelihood to prefer Commonwealth by 15.1 percent.

The predicted probabilities for the effect of years spent living in the US are illustrated in Figure 1(b) by 10-year increments. We report the size of the effects of this variable by subtracting mean preference for each political status at zero (0) years from the mean preference at 70 years lived in the US. Contrary to our hypothesis, years spent in the US increased preference for the Commonwealth status by 21.9 percentage points when going from 0 years to 70 years, but decreased preference for statehood by 9.4 percentage points. As expected, support for independence decreased by 12.6 percentage points with more time spent stateside.

Next, we focus on the effect that English use has on political status preference for Puerto Rico. The predicted probabilities for all three variables are shown in Figure 2. First, we look at the impact of use of English and support for statehood. English being the dominant language at home increased preference for statehood by 15.6 percent when compared to mostly

FIGURE 1

Predicted probabilities for the effect of nativity on all three outcomes of political status preference for Puerto Rico in the 2016 CCES Latino Module and the 1989-90 LNPS. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



using Spanish at home. Language of interview predicted probabilities show that responding mostly in English in 1989-90 increased support of statehood by 4.8 percent. Consuming news in English increased preference for statehood by 18.7 percent in 1989-90. Overall, English proficiency had the expected result of increasing a preference for statehood in all three measures. On the other hand, and contrary to our expectation, English use at home led to a greater likelihood of preferring independence with an increase of 2.6 percentage points. In a similar vein, completing of the survey questionnaire in English and reported consumption of news in English in 1989-90 had a positive effect on preference for independence, an increase of 4.1 and 3.9 percent, respectively.

A preference for English in all three language measures shows a consistent substantial decrease in the likelihood of preference for Commonwealth status in 1989-90, which is aligned with our view that less acculturated Puerto Ricans will be more likely to prefer this political status. English being the dominant language at home decreased support for Commonwealth by 18.3 percent. In addition, completing the survey questionnaire in English also decreased support for Commonwealth status by 8.9 percent. Finally, consuming news mostly in English rather than in Spanish resulted in decreased preference for Commonwealth status by 22.6 percent.

Next, we turn to group identification. As set forth in our hypotheses, we expected preference for identification as Puerto Rican to be associated with preference for independence and Commonwealth, while identification as American was hypothesized to be associated with a preference for statehood for Puerto Rico (recall that the point of reference for both labels is

FIGURE 2

Predicted probabilities for the effect of English proficiency on all three outcomes of political status preference for Puerto Rico in the 2016 CCES Latino Module and the 1989-90 LNPS. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



identifying as Latino/Hispanic or other). Results illustrated in Figure 3 show the effects of preferred group identity on political status preference. We find the expected relationship between identification as American versus identifying as Latino/Hispanic or other and preference for statehood in 1989-90 with an increase of support of 15.8 percentage points. Preferred identification as American also has a positive effect on preference for independence with a 12.6 percent increase. It is noteworthy that the size of the effect is smaller than the effect on support for statehood, showing that this variable is of more importance to determining preference for statehood than independence (see Figure 3[b]). In line with our hypotheses, we found that identification as American led to decreased support for the Commonwealth status among Puerto Ricans living in the US by 28.4 percent.

FIGURE 3

Predicted probabilities for the effect of preferred group identity on all three outcomes of political status preference for Puerto Rico in the 2016 CCES Latino Module and the 1989-90 LNPS. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.



The relations between preferred identification as Puerto Rican and political status preference are aligned with our hypotheses in relation to a preference for statehood and Commonwealth. Identification as Puerto Rican had a positive effect of 15.4 percent on preference for Commonwealth and a decrease in preference for statehood by 12.5 percent. On the other hand, in 1989-90 we find that preferred identification as Puerto Rican versus identifying as Latino/Hispanic or other had a small negative effect on preference for independence, decreasing the likelihood of preference for this political status by 3 percent.

2016 CCES

We now turn to the results of the 2016 CCES study. As in the case with the LNSP results, we first discuss acculturation, and then we turn to group identity. Being born stateside (Figure 1) increased preference for statehood by 2.7 percent versus being born in Puerto Rico. Being born stateside versus being born on the island was also (surprisingly) related to an increased support for independence of 15 percent. While being born in the US increased support for statehood and independence, we find that it decreased the likelihood to prefer the territorial status by 17.8 percent.

The results for the effect of years spent living in the US in the CCES are illustrated in Figure 1(b) using the same calculations as described in the LNPS. The results here, similarly

to the LNPS, run contrary to our expectations. In 2016, years spent stateside increased preference for a territorial status by 50.5 percentage points (when moving from 0 years to 70 years lived in the US), but decreased support for statehood and independence by 34.9 and 15.5 percent, respectively. Only decreased support for independence as years of residence stateside increased matched our hypothesis.

Next, we pay attention to the effect that English proficiency has on political status preference for Puerto Rico (Figure 2). Use of English over Spanish at home is associated with decreased preference of statehood in 2016, but by only 0.5 percentage points (so in practical terms, there is virtually no relationship). On the other hand, and in line with our expectations, selecting English for answering the questionnaire and consuming news in English increased support of statehood by 13.8 and 25.8 percent, respectively.

Contrary to our expectation, English use at home led to a greater likelihood to prefer independence by 14.4 percent. However, in 2016, both variables had a negative effect on preference for independence. Predicted probabilities show a miniscule decrease of 0.8 percent for those Puerto Ricans who chose to complete the survey in English as opposed to Spanish, and a more substantial decrease of 18.6 percent for those who consume news mostly in English as opposed to Spanish.

A preference for English in all three language measures shows a consistent and mostly substantial decrease in the likelihood of preference for a territorial status in 2016. Using English over Spanish at home decreased support for a territorial solution 14 percentage points. Completing the survey questionnaire in English also decreased support for the territorial status by 13 points and consuming news mostly in English rather than in Spanish resulted in decreased preference for territorial option of 7.2 percentage points.

We now turn to group identity. The results in Figure 3 show that identification as American increased preference for statehood by 20.9 percentage points and independence by 3.8 percent but decreased support for a territorial status among Puerto Ricans living in the US by 24.6 percent.

The group identification variable of identifying as Puerto Rican versus identifying as Latino/Hispanic ran contrary to our hypothesis in all the status options. Identifying as Puerto Ricans had a negative effect on preference for independence, decreasing the likelihood of preference for this political status by 20.2 percent. Identification as Puerto Rican also had a negative effect of 3.7 percent on preference for a territorial status. Finally, the relationship between identification as Puerto Rican and preference for statehood has changed from 1989-90 to 2016. Recall that in 1989-90 identification as Puerto Rican led to decreased preference for statehood by 12.5 percent, whereas in 2016 it led to an increase in support for statehood of 24 percent.

Our control variables show age is a consistent indicator of preference for statehood in both 2016 and 1989-90. Age does not have a statistically significant association with preference for independence or a territorial status in 2016, but in 1989-90, age is associated with a statistically significant increase in preference for independence and a decrease in preference for the Commonwealth status (See Table A9 in Appendix A). Higher levels of education are related to a statistically significant decrease in preference for a territorial status in 2016 and for the Commonwealth status in 1989-90. Finally, making an income greater than $30k was associated with less support for a territorial status in 2016 and for the Commonwealth status in 1989-90.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this investigation we seek to understand the influence of acculturation on status preference among Puerto Ricans in the mainland. Status preference is believed to be a long-term preference (Barreto and Eagles 2000) and is a fundamental underpinning of the Puerto Rican political system (Anderson 1988; Cámara Fuertes 2010; Meléndez 1998). In this way, it is like partisan identification. In other words, it is stable and durable. When Puerto Ricans move to a state, it is normal to expect them to bring their status preferences with them and that this preference will not change overnight. Those who grew up stateside most probably heard their parents and other family members talking about the relationship between the island and the mainland.

However, it is important to underscore that when Puerto Ricans migrate to and settle in the US mainland, they can experience a significant political, identity, and cultural transformation, as Duany explains:

> Only when Puerto Ricans reside in one of the fifty states do they acquire the full privileges of US citizenship, such as voting for the president and vice president. They also assume new legal and economic obligations, such as paying federal income taxes. Moreover, they cross significant geographic, linguistic, cultural, and even racial borders when they migrate. Regardless of their political ideology, most Puerto Ricans on the island and in the diaspora see themselves as part of a distinctive Puerto Rican nation. (2011, 26)

Because of this, we focused on the effect of acculturation and group identity on status preference. Acculturation and group identity are important forces that may change or reinforce an individual's belief. Acculturation is part of the incorporation of migrants to their new home and involves the adoption of new values, identities, and attitudes (Gordon 1964; Berry 1997, 1992)—including political attitudes and preferences (Michelson 2003a, 2003b, 2007; Branton 2007; Branton et al. 2010; Branton et al. 2014). Group identification is the sense of belonging and feelings of attachments to a group. Viewing oneself as an American, and thus closer to the identity of the host state, or as Puerto Rican, and maintaining some level of distinctness, can also reinforce or change one's preference for the future of the island. As we discussed above, these concepts have been shown to influence the political attitudes and behaviors of Latinos in the United States. Thus, we can reasonably expect that the process of adapting to a new culture or seeing oneself as part of a group can involve changing or reinforcing one's status preferences for the island.

At the outset we proposed two hypotheses. The first stated that higher levels of acculturation would be associated with a stronger support for statehood and less support for Commonwealth and independence. The second predicted that identifying as Puerto Rican would be related to a stronger support for Commonwealth and independence, while identifying as American would be associated with a stronger support for statehood. Our analysis shows that political status preference among stateside Puerto Ricans is not a static political attitude and that the process of acculturation to American society and group identity can influence views on this particular issue.

The data analysis provides significant, although somewhat imperfect, support for the acculturation hypothesis, particularly for the statehood and Commonwealth preferences. Acculturated individuals tend to favor statehood over Commonwealth. In four of the five acculturation measures—being born stateside and use of English in the interview, at home, and in news media consumption—higher levels of acculturation are related to increased support of statehood and decreased support for Commonwealth in both surveys.[16] While these acculturation variables corroborate our hypothesis, the number of years spent in the US for those not born stateside goes against this trend. Living longer in the US is associated in both surveys with a stronger support for Commonwealth and less support for statehood.

Group identity is somewhat less successful in explaining status preference. As expected, using the identity of "American" is positively associated with statehood and negatively associated with Commonwealth/territory in both surveys. In addition, identifying as "Puerto Rican" was positively related to Commonwealth and negatively related to statehood in the 1989-90 LNPS survey. Contrary to expectations, however, in the 2016 CCES survey, identifying as Puerto Rican was negatively related to the territorial option and positively related to support for statehood.

Interestingly, and somewhat puzzling, the preference for independence moves contrary to the predictions stated in the acculturation and group identity hypotheses. Higher levels of acculturation are positively related to support for independence in four out of five variables in the LNPS and in two in the CCES. Support for independence moves in the expected direction in the LNPS and the CCES in the numbers of years living stateside, when the trend of both statehood and independence is against what is expected. Identifying as American is positively related to support for independence and identifying as Puerto Rican negatively related to it. The reason for these unexpected results is difficult to explain. Perhaps it is a function of the small number of cases that support this option. This is an open and interesting question to be addressed by further research.

In addition to the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, the differences between the surveys tells an interesting story. The results present a contrast between the stateside Puerto Rican population of the late 1980s with that of the late 2010s regarding their political status preferences and how these preferences are related to their level of acculturation to the United States and their attachment to group identity as American or Puerto Rican. Perhaps most important, while over 20 years passed between the administration of the 1989-90 LNPS and that of the 2016 CCES Latino Module, most of the results across both surveys remain consistent.

One important change is that the Commonwealth status is no longer the preferred political status among Puerto Ricans living in the United States, statehood is now the dominant political status preference among this population—something that is reflected in the changing plebiscite votes on the island discussed above. This reality is also reflected in the mainland with the election of pro-statehood members of Congress like Darren Soto (D-FL) and Ritchie Torres (D-NY).

In a similar vein, the results of the years lived stateside variable are particularly interesting. While in both surveys all three status variables retained the same sign—negative for statehood and independence and positive for Commonwealth—the size of the impact on two of

them has changed significantly. The impact of living longer stateside decreased for statehood from -9.4 percent to -34.9 percent and increased for Commonwealth from +21.9 to +50.5 percent (independence remained almost the same). This can be interpreted in two different ways. Looking at these results from an acculturation perspective, we find that the acculturation process, namely, living more stateside, pushes people away from statehood and toward supporting the Commonwealth.

However, given that the language variable consistently shows an increase of support for statehood and rejection of Commonwealth as acculturation—use of English—increases, this means that time living stateside is likely a measure of the difference in the migrating waves. More recent migrants (less time living stateside) favor statehood more strongly and Commonwealth significantly less. This is in line with the rise of support for statehood in the island. Older generations of migrants—who have lived more time stateside—arrived in the US when Commonwealth was the preferred status. Perhaps the increasing dependence of individuals on the island economy of federal transfer resulted in a long economic contraction, one experienced since the beginning of the twenty-first century, This situation, as well as recent natural disasters, has had an influence in these newer migrants

This may be a reflection of changes in migration patterns. During the twentieth century, migration between the Island and the mainland used to be a phenomenon of the unemployed, the poorly educated and unskilled, and the lower strata of the socioeconomic status (Dietz 1982; Duany 2011). While in the twenty-first century those still account for a majority of the migrants, now middle-class, skilled professionals such as doctors, engineers, and teachers, are migrating too and account for about 21 percent of Puerto Rican migrants (Duany 2015; Duany 2017; Pérez 2018). As Duany (2015) states, "Even though the migration by administrators and professionals appears to have increased recently, the economic crisis [in Puerto Rico] has hit all the levels of Puerto Rican society."

We also find that the role of social group identity has changed with respect to the views of stateside Puerto Ricans when comparing data from the early 1990s and the mid-2000s. Thirty years ago attachment to group identity as Puerto Rican meant having a low likelihood of supporting statehood, but now it means being very likely to support statehood. This suggests that Puerto Rican national identity could now be less of a politicized identity than it was decades ago.

In all, acculturation, and to a lesser degree group identification, do influence status preference. Earlier we compared status preference to party identification: both are stable and long-term attitudes. As in our case, the literature on Latinos and Puerto Ricans residing stateside has found a similar impact on partisanship. Partisan is indeed a powerful variable, as it can trump ethnicity when voting (Michelson 2005). However, it is not beyond change from acculturation and group influences. Stateside Latinos become more Democratic as they spend more time in the US, an effect that continues into the second and third generations (Cain, Kieweit and Uhlaner 1991). Puerto Ricans who socialize more with Anglos tend to be more Republican, while those who socialize mostly among Puerto Ricans tend to be more Democratic. Also, those Puerto Ricans who are born in the mainland tend to be more Democratic, and of those who migrate, the more time they spend stateside, the more they identify with the Democratic party (Uhlaner and García 2005).

Status politics have come to garner attention in presidential elections, when then-presidential candidate Biden indicated that he supported statehood during the 2020 campaign, while some Republican elected officials indicated that they oppose statehood. We believe that as Puerto Ricans become politically active, bolstered by their numbers stateside, they can be an important lobbying force for other issues related to the island. This was clearly demonstrated in the congressional initiatives and battles around disaster relief for Hurricane María. Aid for Puerto Rico was the flashpoint for the debates between congressional Democrats and Republicans, and involved Trump in the debates in 2019 (Cochrane 2019). Notably, even non-status related issues like this one can be colored by status preference—as, for example, when some supporters of statehood framed the slow response of the federal government to Hurricane María, claiming that it was a result of the island not being a US state (Ballesteros 2018). Our investigation begins to fill the void in understanding why the Puerto Rican community in the US prefers certain status alternatives over others. It is our hope that this article helps spark research on how stateside Puerto Ricans connect with and influence island politics.

Thus, we point out two areas that are interesting avenues for future research: transnationalism and dispersion. Transnationalism, in the case of Puerto Rico, is the continued movement of people between the island and the mainland and the continuing communications between the two groups. Duany (2011) states that this is a significant component of the Puerto Rican migration: many Puerto Ricans do not just migrate stateside and stay there, but rather people move from the island to the mainland and repeat the process in a loop—the "ir y venir" (coming and going).[17] The impact of this movement of people and communications likely has an impact on status preference and is an important avenue of future research.

Another aspect is the increasing dispersion of Puerto Ricans away from their traditional urban centers such as New York City or Chicago to states such as Florida or Texas (Duany 2006; Silver and Vélez 2017; Hinojosa 2018). Duany (2006) argues that this dispersion has important implications for their identity and socioeconomic progress. Furthermore, he argues that there are differences between those who live in the traditional urban Puerto Rican enclaves and in newer ones, both in their origins and in their social and political incorporation into their new communities. Furthermore, dispersion has changed the way these Puerto Ricans relate to other groups and the way they identify themselves racial and ethnically (Silver and Vélez 2017). These two are important avenues for research into the status preferences of Puerto Ricans living stateside.

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NOTES

[1] See Table A1 in the appendix for further detail. The total number of congressional bills and cosponsors relating to the status of Puerto Rico were sources from a search of the Congress.gov database of all congressional legislation using the words "Puerto Rico" and "status" during June 2019.

[2] The five-volume *Historia Constitucional de Puerto Rico* by José Trías Monge is an excellent work that details the constitutional evolution of the island and its relation to the United States.

[3] The ballot in this plebiscite asked about support or rejection to the current territorial status and not to the Commonwealth.

[4] Mora, Dávila and Rodríguez (2017) call this massive migration after the start of the 2006 recession "La Crisis Boricua" (The Puerto Rican Crisis).

[5] The CCES is an online survey consisting of a representative sample of more than 64,000 adults living in the United States. Respondents opt in as volunteers from the YouGov database using data from the US Census Bureau, voter registration databases, the Pew US Religious Landscape Survey, and the Current Population Survey. The CCES has been shown to produce similar estimates to telephone and mail surveys (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014). The 2016 CCES collected interviews from September and October of 2016 (pre-election), and re-interviewed respondents in November of 2016 (post-election).

[6] LNPS wording of status question: "Some people want Puerto Rico to become a state, others want it to become independent, and others want it to remain as it is, a Commonwealth. What do you think? Do you think that Puerto Rico should:1-become a state, 2-become independent, 3-or remain as a commonwealth?"

[7] In April 2021, the president of the Puerto Rico House of Representatives, Rafael "Tatito" Hernández (PPD), acknowledged that the Commonwealth was of a territorial nature (something that many in his party had already accepted). He said, "There are people who believe in the ELA (Commonwealth) as it is, colonial, territorial, with whatever name you want to call it." ["Hay gente que cree en el ELA como está, colonial, territorial, con el nombre que usted quiera."] (CyberNews 2021). In January 2021, at least twenty PPD members of the Puerto Rico House of Representatives conditioned support for Nydia Velazquez and Alexandia Ocasio Cortez's status bill in the US House of Representatives, so that it would include "four status alternatives recognized in the 2011 White House Working Group on Puerto Rico: independence, free association ["libre asociación"], territorial Commonwealth [Estado Libre Asociado territorial] and statehood" (Delgado 2021).

[8] The percentages discussed here are based on weighted totals that exclude individuals who did not respond to the status question and excludes those who said they did not know which was their preferred political status in both surveys.

[9] See Table A1 in the appendix for a variable summary table.

[10] Respondents could report whether English (1), Spanish (-1) or both (0) were used most often in their households.

[11] This is the exact question wording for the first identity label question in the LNPS 1989-90: "Here is a list of names that are used to describe persons of Spanish heritage. Please tell me all of those, if any, you call yourself."

[12] Of all Puerto Ricans in the LNPS, 1.35 percent only circled "American," while 33.82 percent only circled "Puerto Rican."

[13] Of all Puerto Ricans in the LNPS, 7.7 percent said that "American" was their preferred identity label,

and 38.84 percent said that "Puerto Rican" was their preferred identity label among all other labels they circled in the previous question.

[14] For a more detailed explanation of the relationship of income and status preference in Puerto Rico, see Maldonado Denis 1969; Quintero 1986; Benítez 1991.

[15] Regression tables are included in the appendix. Had we used regression tables to present our results, analysis would have required three regressions per study and a more cumbersome discussion of those results by limiting our focus on paired comparisons between only two of the three outcomes at one time.

[16] The only exception is the preference of using English at home in the 2016 CCES survey. However, the substantive impact of this relationship is very small.

[17] Vargas Ramos (2015) disputes the existence of strong transnationalism in Puerto Rican migrants.

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APPENDIX A

Table A1. Congressional Bills on the Political Status of Puerto Rico 1977–2019

Bill	Name	Year Introduced	Congress	Sponsor Party	Sponsor State	# of Co-sponsors	Bill Passed
H.R.2201	Puerto Rico Statehood Act	1977	95	R	Michigan	0	
H.R.2849	A bill to provide for referenda and the development of enabling legislation regarding incorporation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico into the Union as a state.	1987	100	R	California	3	
S.1182	A bill to provide for a referendum in Puerto Rico on the admission of Puerto Rico into the Union as a state.	1987	100	R	Kansas	4	
S.712	Puerto Rico Status Referendum Act	1989	101	D	Louisiana	2	
S.710	A bill to provide for a referendum on the political status of Puerto Rico.	1989	101	D	Louisiana	2	
S.711	A bill to provide for a referendum on the political status of Puerto Rico.	1989	101	D	Louisiana	2	
H.R.3536	Puerto Rico Status Referendum Act	1990	101	R	California	8	
H.R.4765	Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act	1990	101	D	Virgin Islands	20	Yes
S.244	Puerto Rico Status Referendum Act	1991	102	D	Louisiana	3	
H.R.316	Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act	1991	102	D	Virgin Islands	14	
S.2019	A bill to provide for referenda to resolve the political status of Puerto Rico, and for other purposes.	1996	104	R	Idaho	6	
H.R.4281	United States-Puerto Rico Political Status Act	1996	104	R	Alaska	2	
H.R.3024	United States-Puerto Rico Political Status Act	1996	104	R	Alaska	59	
H.R.4228	United States-Puerto Rico Political Status Act	1996	104	R	Alaska	0	

APPENDIX A (continued)
Table A1. Congressional Bills on the Political Status of Puerto Rico 1977–2019

Bill	Name	Year Introduced	Congress	Sponsor Party	Sponsor State	# of Co-sponsors	Bill Passed
S.472	A bill to provide for referenda in which the residents of Puerto Rico may express democratically their preferences regarding the political status of the territory, and for other purposes.	1998	105	R	Idaho	16	
H.R.856	United States-Puerto Rico Political Status Act	1998	105	R	Alaska	87	Yes
S.2661	Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2006	2006	109	R	Florida	14	
H.R.4867	Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2006	2006	109	R	Puerto Rico	110	
H.R.4963	Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2006	2006	109	R	Tennessee	42	
S.2304	Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2006	2006	109	R	North Carolina	3	
S.1936	Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2007	2007	110	D	Colorado	15	
H.R.900	Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2007	2007	110	D	New York	129	
H.R.1230	Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of 2007	2007	110	D	New York	48	
H.R.2499	Puerto Rico Democracy Act of 2010	2010	111	D	Puerto Rico	181	Yes
H.R.2000	Puerto Rico Status Resolution Act	2013	113	D	Puerto Rico	131	
S.2020	Puerto Rico Status Resolution Act	2014	113	D	New Mexico	2	
H.R.727	Puerto Rico Statehood Admission Process Act	2015	114	D	Puerto Rico	110	
H.R.260	Puerto Rico Admission Act	2017	115	R	Puerto Rico	1	
H.R.6246	Puerto Rico Admission Act of 2018	2018	115	R	Puerto Rico	58	
H.R.1965	Puerto Rico Admission Act	2019	116	D	Florida	1	

Note: Data retrieved from search of all congressional legislation on Puerto Rico's political status using search words “Puerto Rico” and “statehood” on https://www.congress.gov/ during the month of May 2019.

Table A2. Independent Variable Summary Statistics for Puerto Ricans

Variable	2016 CCES Latino Module	LNPS 1989-90
Mean Age	42	41
Education		
Less than High School	17.40%	79.06%
High School	47.30%	9.53%
Some College	26.10%	4.09%
4yr College/BA plus	9.20%	7.32%
Household Income		
$30K or more		20.22%
$50K or more	22.23%	
Nativity		
Born in the US	31.98%	34.62%
Mean Years in the US	27	26
Language of Interview		
English or Mostly English	66.63%	46.49%
Both Spanish and English	na	5.47%
Spanish or Mostly Spanish	33.37%	48.03%
Language at Home		
Mostly English	16.04%	25.66%
Both Spanish and English	54.73%	29.79%
Mostly Spanish	31.23%	44.56%
Language of News TV and Print		
Mostly English	61.55%	47.22%
Both Spanish and English	20.93%	30.00%
Mostly Spanish	17.52%	22.79%
Group Identity		
Preferred Identity is "American"	10.85%	9.05%
Preferred Identity is "Puerto Rican"	67.45%	72.66%

Note: Totals and percentages are weighted.

Table A3. Puerto Ricans' Preferred Political Status for Puerto Rico, 2016 CCES Latino Module

Puerto Rico Political Status	Frequency	Percent
Become a state of the United States	68	41
Become an independent country	25	15
Remain a territory of the United States	55	33
Don't know	19	11
Skipped	0	0
Total	**168**	**100**

Note: Totals and percentages are weighted. Values correspond to question "LM327."

Table A4. Preferred Political Status for Puerto Rico, Puerto Ricans in the LNPS 1989–90

Puerto Rico Political Status	Frequency	Percent
Become a state	153	26
Become independent	18	3
Remain as a commonwealth	397	67
Uncertain/ don't care/ no opinion/ don't know	21	4
Total	**589**	**100**

Note: Totals and percentages are weighted. Values correspond to question "Q135:R'S OPINION OF PUERTO RICO'S STATUS" in the LNPS 1989-90.

Table A5. Multinomial Logistic Regression for the Effect of Acculturation and Group Identity on PR Status Preference, Statehood vs. Territory/Commonwealth.

Variable	Model I - 2016 CCES Latino Module		Model II - LNPS 1989-90	
	Statehood	**Territory**	**Statehood**	**Commonwealth**
Born in the US	-1.753	-3.111**	-2.617**	-3.498***
	(1.298)	(1.389)	(1.121)	(1.117)
Years in the US	1.318	4.508	3.745**	4.671***
	(2.776)	(2.975)	(1.638)	(1.608)
English use at home	-1.818*	-1.292	1.248**	1.126**
	(1.058)	(1.051)	(0.544)	(0.538)
English - language of interview	-1.007	-2.539**	-0.938**	-0.684*
	(1.136)	(1.222)	(0.426)	(0.384)
English - language of news TV & print	2.343***	2.069**	-0.189	-0.885
	(0.811)	(0.863)	(0.635)	(0.610)
American ID	0.523	-2.857*	-2.443**	-2.667**
	(1.114)	(1.608)	(1.178)	(1.161)
Puerto Rican ID	2.104**	0.0378	-1.469	-1.108
	(1.008)	(0.985)	(0.966)	(0.941)
Age	7.616**	7.890**	-5.286**	-8.139***
	(3.167)	(3.396)	(2.126)	(2.103)
Education	2.698**	2.291*	-1.552*	-2.216**
	(1.329)	(1.379)	(0.852)	(0.920)
More than $50k/More than $30k	4.474***	3.858***	-0.103	0.226
	(1.191)	(1.287)	(0.917)	(0.925)
Constant	-4.029***	-2.396*	6.138***	7.821***
	(1.254)	(1.245)	(1.578)	(1.564)
Observations	155		487	
Pseudo R2	0.1717		0.0525	

Note: Table shows weighted multinomial logistic regression model coefficients where Independence is the omitted category in the dependent variable. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6. Nativity Predicted Probabilities for All Outcomes in Puerto Rico Political Status Multinomial Logit Model

2016 CCES Latino Survey

Born in the US	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
No	0.485	0.000	2.7%
Yes	0.512	0.000	
Independence			
No	0.133	0.000	15.0%
Yes	0.283	0.000	
Territory			
No	0.382	0.000	-17.8%
Yes	0.204	0.000	
Years in the US			
Statehood			
0 years	0.622	0.000	-34.9%
70 years	0.273	0.115	
Independence			
0 years	0.226	0.004	-15.5%
70 years	0.071	0.308	
Territory			
0 years	0.152	0.153	50.5%
70 years	0.657	0.001	

LNPS 1989-90

Born in the US	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
No	0.250	0.000	9.8%
Yes	0.347	0.000	
Independence			
No	0.017	0.047	5.3%
Yes	0.070	0.003	
Territory			
No	0.734	0.000	-15.1%
Yes	0.583	0.000	
Years in the US			
Statehood			
0 years	0.300	0.000	-9.4%
70 years	0.207	0.041	
Independence			
0 years	0.131	0.022	-12.6%
70 years	0.006	0.165	
Territory			
0 years	0.568	0.000	21.9%
70 years	0.787	0.000	

Note: Values represent predicted probabilities for preferred political status for Puerto Rico based on the lowest and highest values of each nativity variable.

Table A7. English Proficiency Predicted Probabilities for All Outcomes in Puerto Rico Political Status Multinomial Logit Model

2016 CCES Latino Survey

Language Use at Home	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
Spanish	0.459	0.000	
Both	0.524	0.000	-0.5%
English	0.454	0.000	
Independence			
Spanish	0.196	0.000	
Both	0.128	0.000	14.4%
English	0.340	0.000	
Territory			
Spanish	0.345	0.000	
Both	0.348	0.000	-14.0%
English	0.206	0.004	
Language of Interview	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
Spanish	0.405	0.000	13.8%
English	0.543	0.000	
Independence			
Spanish	0.189	0.000	-0.8%
English	0.180	0.000	
Territory			
Spanish	0.406	0.000	-13.0%
English	0.276	0.004	
Language of News	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
Spanish	0.295	0.021	
Both	0.491	0.000	25.8%
English	0.553	0.000	
Independence			
Spanish	0.337	0.000	
Both	0.146	0.000	-18.6%
English	0.151	0.000	
Territory			
Spanish	0.368	0.005	
Both	0.362	0.000	-7.2%
English	0.296	0.000	

Note: Values represent predicted probabilities for preferred political status for Puerto Rico based on the lowest and highest values of each English proficiency and use variable.

Table A7 (continued). English Proficiency Predicted Probabilities for All Outcomes in Puerto Rico Political Status Multinomial Logit Model

LNPS 1989-90

Language Use at Home	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
Spanish	0.224	0.000	
Both	0.284	0.000	15.6%
English	0.381	0.000	
Independence			
Spanish	0.031	0.023	
Both	0.023	0.001	2.6%
English	0.057	0.020	
Territory			
Spanish	0.744	0.000	
Both	0.694	0.000	-18.3%
English	0.562	0.000	
Language of Interview	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
Spanish	0.263	0.000	
Both	0.219	0.000	4.8%
English	0.311	0.000	
Independence			
Spanish	0.015	0.124	
Both	0.023	0.025	4.1%
English	0.056	0.002	
Territory			
Spanish	0.722	0.000	
Both	0.758	0.000	-8.9%
English	0.633	0.000	
Language of News	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
Spanish	0.172	0.000	
Both	0.244	0.000	18.7%
English	0.359	0.000	
Independence			
Spanish	0.017	0.247	
Both	0.015	0.024	3.9%
English	0.057	0.002	
Territory			
Spanish	0.810	0.000	
Both	0.741	0.000	-22.6%
English	0.584	0.000	

Note: Values represent predicted probabilities for preferred political status for Puerto Rico based on the lowest and highest values of each English proficiency and use variable.

Table A8. Identity Predicted Probabilities for All Outcomes in Puerto Rico Political Status Multinomial Logit Model

2016 CCES Latino Survey

American ID	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
0	0.470	0.000	20.9%
1	0.678	0.000	
Independence			
0	0.179	0.000	3.8%
1	0.217	0.011	
Territory			
0	0.351	0.000	-24.6%
1	0.105	0.184	
Puerto Rican ID	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
0	0.340	0.000	24.0%
1	0.580	0.000	
Independence			
0	0.313	0.000	-20.2%
1	0.111	0.000	
Territory			
0	0.347	0.000	-3.7%
1	0.105	0.184	

LNPS 1989-90

American ID	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
0	0.270	0.000	15.8%
1	0.428	0.000	
Independence			
0	0.024	0.004	12.6%
1	0.150	0.036	
Commonwealth			
0	0.707	0.000	-28.4%
1	0.422	0.000	
Puerto Rican ID	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
0	0.373	0.000	-12.5%
1	0.248	0.000	
Independence			
0	0.057	0.018	-3.0%
1	0.027	0.008	
Commonwealth			
0	0.570	0.000	15.4%
1	0.725	0.000	

Note: Values represent predicted probabilities for preferred political status for Puerto Rico based on the lowest and highest values of each nativity variable.

Table A9. Control Variable Predicted Probabilities for All Outcomes in Puerto Rico Political Status Multinomial Logit Model

2016 CCES Latino Survey

Age	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
18	0.025	0.011	50.5%
81	0.529	0.036	
Independence			
18	0.868	0.000	-86.1%
75	0.006	0.642	
Territory			
18	0.108	0.167	36.3%
81	0.471	0.122	
Education	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
less HS	0.423	0.001	30.0%
HS	0.450	0.000	
Assoc degree	0.515	0.000	
BA plus	0.722	0.000	
Independence			
less HS	0.069	0.092	-4.5%
HS	0.254	0.000	
Assoc degree	0.180	0.000	
BA plus	0.024	0.044	
Territory			
less HS	0.508	0.000	-25.5%
HS	0.296	0.000	
Assoc degree	0.305	0.000	
BA plus	0.253	0.006	
More than $30k	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
0	0.418	0.000	29.9%
1	0.717	0.000	
Independence			
0	0.239	0.000	-21.9%
1	0.019	0.073	
Commonwealth			
0	0.343	0.000	-7.9%
1	0.264	0.001	

Note: Values represent predicted probabilities for preferred political status for Puerto Rico based on the lowest and highest values of each control variable: age, education and income.

Table A9 (continued). Control Variable Predicted Probabilities for All Outcomes in Puerto Rico Political Status Multinomial Logit Model

LNPS 1989-90

Age	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
18	0.140	0.000	23.4%
86	0.375	0.005	
Independence			
18	0.002	0.020	8.7%
86	0.089	0.009	
Commonwealth			
18	0.697	0.000	-20.4%
86	0.492	0.001	
Education	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
less HS	0.262	0.000	12.9%
HS	0.345	0.000	
Assoc degree	0.368	0.000	
BA plus	0.390	0.000	
Independence			
less HS	0.022	0.007	12.6%
HS	0.036	0.001	
Assoc degree	0.092	0.016	
BA plus	0.148	0.032	
Territory			
less HS	0.716	0.000	-25.4%
HS	0.618	0.000	
Assoc degree	0.540	0.000	
BA plus	0.462	0.000	
More than $30k	**Probability**	**P-Value**	**Size of Effect**
Statehood			
0	0.284	0.000	-0.1%
1	0.284	0.000	
Independence			
0	0.032	0.002	1.7%
1	0.049	0.064	
Commonwealth			
0	0.684	0.000	-1.7%
1	0.667	0.000	

Note: Values represent predicted probabilities for preferred political status for Puerto Rico based on the lowest and highest values of each control variable: age, education and income.

APPENDIX B
Latino National Political Survey 1989-90

Details on how the LNPS 1989-90 was conducted is readily available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). An overview of the LNPS 1989-90 can be accessed at the following ICPSR website: https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/ICPSR/studies/6841

- The LNPS 1989-90 is described as follows:

> This data collection measures the political attitudes and behaviors of three specific Latino groups in the United States: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban. A geographic Latino population coverage rate of at least 85 percent was desired for this study. Variables cover the respondent's family history, organizational memberships, political participation, voting practices, preferences on policy issues, views toward political parties and political candidates/leaders, political behavior, sources of political information such as the media, feelings about political trust and efficacy, perceptions of the relationship between government and Latino groups, and degree of concern about international issues and social problems. Demographic variables include sex, age, ethnicity, marital status, education, education of parents and spouse, parental status, religious preference, employment status, occupation, home ownership, military service, country of origin, and citizenship.

- The LNPS used an "[a]rea probability national sample of Latino households from a selection of 40 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) stratified based on Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) and rural counties." The universe from which the sample was drawn was the "[a]dult population (18 years and older) of the United States who are Puerto Rican, Mexican, or Cuban with one parent or at least two grandparents solely of Puerto Rican/Mexican/Cuban origin."
- The LNPS was conducted through in-person interviews from July 1989 to March 1990, with a response rate of 82% for the full sample of 3,415 and a response rate of 74% for all Latinos in the sample, a total of 2,817.
- The LNPS Latino sample is described as follows:

> The total number of Latino interviews conducted was 2,817, and 598 non-Latino interviews were completed. Of the Latino total, 1,546 were Mexican, 589 were Puerto Rican and 682 were Cuban.

APPENDIX C
2016 CCES Latino Module

Details on how the CCES (now CES) is conducted is readily available at https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/ where this survey is described as follows:

> The CCES is a 50,000+ person national stratified sample survey administered by YouGov. Half of the questionnaire consists of Common Content asked of all 50,000+ people, and half of the questionnaire consists of Team Content designed by each individual

> participating team and asked of a subset of 1,000 people. In addition, several teams may pool their resources to create Group Content.
>
> The survey consists of two waves in election years. In the pre-election wave, respondents answer two-thirds of the questionnaire. This segment of the survey asks about general political attitudes, various demographic factors, assessment of roll call voting choices, political information, and vote intentions. The pre-election wave is in the field from late September to late October. In the post-election wave, respondents answer the other third of the questionnaire, mostly consisting of items related to the election that just occurred. The post-election wave is administered in November.
>
> In non-election years, the survey consists of a single wave conducted in the fall.

Furthermore, the "Guide to the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study" provides a full description of the 2016 CCES Common Content including sampling methodology, response and cooperation rates, questionnaire items and top line frequencies. In the "Guide" the 2016 CCES is described as follows:

> The 2016 CCES involved 60 teams, yielding a Common Content sample of 64,600 cases. The subjects for this study were recruited during the fall of 2016. Each research team purchased a 1,000 person national sample survey, conducted by YouGov of Redwood City, CA. Interviews for the 2016 survey were conducted in two waves. The pre-election wave of the questionnaire was in the field from September 28 to November 7; the post-election wave was in the field from November 9 to December 14. Each survey has approximately 120 questions. For each survey of 1,000 persons, half of the questionnaire was developed and controlled entirely by each individual research team, and half of the questionnaire is devoted to Common Content. The Common Content consists of the questions common to all team modules and has a sample size equal to the total sample size of all team modules combined. Most of the 60 teams purchased 1,000 person surveys, though a few teams purchased additional cases to increase their sample size and size of the Common Content. All cases were selected through the Internet and YouGov constructed matched random samples for this study. (7)

- Sampling: YouGov uses a matched random sample methodology to create their sample which produces similar survey estimates to those of telephone and mail surveys (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014). This sampling method is described in detail in pages 12 to 15 of the "Guide."
- Response/Cooperation Rates: The 2016 CCES Common Content had an average response rate of 45% and average cooperation rate of 84% as reported in the Table of AAPOR Outcome Rates presented on page 11 of the "Guide."

The 2016 CCES Latino Module constitutes "Team Content," meaning that only those included in the Latino Module sample responded to the questionnaire items that were specifically created for the all Latino sample in the 2016 CCES. Latino respondents in the rest of the 2016 CCES Common Content

sample did not receive the Latino Module questionnaire. More specifically, they were not asked the Puerto Rico status question, which is the main dependent variable in our study. The 2016 CCES Latino Module includes a sample of 2,023 voting-age Latinos culled from the YouGov pool of respondents and other vendors.

APPENDIX D
Don't Know and "El Status"

In this appendix we examine the factors that may be related to the likelihood of not reporting a status preference for Puerto Rico among Puerto Rican respondents to the 2016 CCES Latino Module and the Latino National Political Survey of 1989-90. We are particularly interested in the possible effect of acculturation variables on the likelihood to respond "don't know" to the status question in both surveys. Having been born in the US mainland, having spent many years living in the US, and high English proficiency could be factors that lead to less knowledge of the "status issue" through physical, temporal, and social distance from Puerto Rican politics. In the 2016 CCES Latino Module we find that 19 respondents out of 168, and 21 out of 589 report a "don't know" answer to the Puerto Rico political status preference question (See Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix A).

The "Don't Know" models presented in Table D1 use a dichotomous dependent variable where having reported a "don't know" answer to the Puerto Rico political status preference question is the indicator and all responses reporting a status preference equal zero. The independent variables in the models are the same as the ten included in the main paper. Logistic regression results show that completing the 2016 CCES Latino Module questionnaire in English is a strong predictor of "don't know" reports among Puerto Rican respondents to the Puerto Rico status question, age is also predictive at the $p<0.1$ level of a greater likelihood to answer "don't know." In that same survey, more years spent in the US and having a household income above $50K are associated with a decreased likelihood at the $p<0.1$ level of answering "don't know" to the status question. In the LNPS 1989-90, age is strongly associated with the likelihood to answer "don't know" and being born in the US is associated with answering "don't know" at the $p<0.1$ level. Additionally, years spent living in the US is strongly associated with decreased likelihood of answering "don't know" to the status question.

These results quell any possible concerns that temporal distance from Puerto Rican politics is a factor that leads to non-attitudes on Puerto Rico's political status. However, it appears that preferring English over Spanish in the survey administration process in the 2016 CCES Latino Module is telling of either a lack of interest or knowledge regarding the status issue. Still, this factor did not prevent most Puerto Rican participants in the survey from reporting a status preference. This analysis serves as a robustness check of the results discussed in the main text because a majority of the factors included in our status preference models are nor associated with reporting non-attitudes in the form of "don't know" answers.

Table D1. Logistic Regression for the Effect of Acculturation and Group Identity on Don't Know Responses Versus Selecting Puerto Rico Status Preference

Don't Know Models	**2016 CCES Latino Module**	**LNPS 1989-90**
Born in the US	-0.676	1.869*
	(0.797)	(1.033)
Years in the US	-3.135*	-7.778***
	(1.828)	(2.125)
English use at home	0.0549	0.155
	(0.834)	(0.504)
English - language of interview	4.898***	0.205
	(1.708)	(0.613)
English - language of news TV & print	-1.408	0.422
	(0.889)	(0.614)
American ID	1.686	0.183
	(1.318)	(1.405)
Puerto Rican ID	-0.217	0.792
	(0.913)	(0.844)
Age	0.0417*	4.904***
	(0.0236)	(1.810)
Education	-0.657	0.623
	(0.451)	(1.436)
More than $50k/More than $30k	-1.729*	-0.230
	(0.992)	(0.828)
Constant	-4.258**	-3.758**
	(1.779)	(1.482)
Observations	173	499
Pseudo R2	0.1496	0.0660

Note: Table shows weighted logistic regression model coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1